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Class action suits, long a problem for the courts under old Rule
23, have once again become embroiled in judicial controversy. The
disagreement centers around the extent to which class members in
23 (b)(3) suits' can be required, 2 if at all,3 to furnish information
1. A suit is maintainable as a class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) if the
court finds that common questions of law or fact predominate and the class action
is the superior method of adjudication; under 23(b)(2) if injunctive or declaratory
relief is sought "with respect to the class as a whole"; or under 23(b)(1) if the prose-
cution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create
a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. The question of requiring information
or affirmative action from absent class members has arisen only in (b)(3) class actions.
In suits maintainable as class actions under (b)(1) or (b)(2) the entire class is necessarily
bound by the judgment. Class members cannot opt out of the action as they can in
(b)(3) suits. See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRtcrICE 23.31, at 527 (2d ed. 1969).
2. A number of courts have held that class members must take some affirmative
action in order to be included in the judgment. See Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noin. Herriman v. Mid-
western United Life Ins. Co., 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309
F. Supp. 354, 356 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 599 (D.
Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (with respect to the class of government entities); Harris v. Jones, 41
F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966). See also 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACarcE 23.55, at 1161 (2d
ed. 1969), approving this practice; and 7A C. WRICHT & A. MIILLER, FEDERAL PRACrzCE
& PROCEDURE § 1792, at 196 n.96 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER], agree-
ing that discovery is available against absent class members; cf. Quinault Allottee Ass'n
v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272 (Ct. Cl. 1972), where the Court of Claims required
class members to exclude themselves and to take affirmative action for inclusion. The
Court of Claims is not compelled to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
had not adopted a rule equivalent to Rule 23, although it borrowed some concepts from
the federal rule.
3. Courts rejecting the practice of compelling information of absent class members
before trial fall into two categories: those which request information but refuse to
penalize inaction and those which refuse to impose any affirmative duties or require-
ments. Cases in which courts requested information but refused to apply penalties
include Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 62, 72 (D.D.C. 1972); Abulaban v.
R.W. Pressprich & Co., 51 F.R.D. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); and Korn v. Franchard, 50
F.R.D. 57, 60, class action designiation withdrawn, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972). The
court in Abulaban noted that "[f]ailure to file any document in the nature of an
inclusionary request should not, in the initial stages of the litigation, preclude a
person from being considered a member of the class." However, the court agreed to
include a form of request for exclusion from the class along with notice. 51 F.R.D. at
497.
Cases in which courts refused to impose any duties on absent class members include
Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460 (D. Utah 1972); Fischer v. Wolfinbar-
ger, 55 F.R.D. 129 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D.
Ga. 1972); Berman v. Naragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333 (D.R.I. 1969); Kronenburg
v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); and the co-
ordinated pretrial proceedings in In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
267, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 333 F. Supp. 278, 279-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), wherein the court
required proofs of claim from the government entities within each state but refused to
require proofs of claim from absent individual class members prior to trial, particularly
since such class members were unlikely to have individual claims large enough to justify
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before trial to the court or to the defendant as a condition to par-
ticipation in class recoveries, and what sanctions may be imposed for
noncompliance. On its face, the new Rule 23 does not explicitly
authorize any discovery of class members, yet some courts have not
only required such discovery, but have also dismissed or threatened
to dismiss with prejudice the claims of nonresponding class members.4
Courts taking this general position have failed to articulate an ac-
ceptable standard for determining when information is warranted.
There is thus the danger that discovery may be too easily granted
and the particular sanction imposed may be unjustifiable in light of
the basic purposes of a class action suit.
On the other hand, situations conceivably exist where a carefully
policed discovery or request for information by the court, possibly
with limited penalties, is appropriate. Courts may be justified in giv-
ing the class action rule a broader reading than its language appar-
ently calls for when justice or manageability so requires. Courts should
be extremely hesitant, however, to resort to the drastic measure of
dismissal with prejudice to enforce such efforts, particularly since
milder steps which achieve the same degree of manageability and
fairness exist.
I. The Language of the Rules
Relying on the Federal Rules for discovery5 or an implied au-
thority in Rule 23, some courts have required absent class members
to file, before trial, actual claims, 6 statements of intent to submit
the expense of executing a proof-of-claim form until they were assured of recovery.
In Gardner, the court refused to allow the defendants to pose interrogatories to class
members on the ground that they were "unnecessary and unjustifiably dilatory" despite
the fact that the defendant sought no penalty. Nonetheless, the court maintained that
courts had the discretionary power to "allow the submissions of interrogatories to the
members of the class at an appropriate time and for essential purposes." 55 F.R.D. at 462.
4. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971); Iowa
v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Phila-
delphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Utah 1966). In Minnesota v. United States Steel
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968), the court suggested that nonresponding
class members would be "barred and excluded from the classes." This wording is
ambiguous. The court may have intended to dismiss with prejudice; however, another
court viewed the action as an exclusion without prejudice. See Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., supra at 1004 n.2.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 33, 34, 37.
6. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968) (re-
quiring the execution of a proof of claim form, with detailed information about pur-
chases); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Utah 1966) (requiring "simple statements
of . .. claims . . . particularly with reference to the types and sources of representa-
tion, if any, upon which they relied in purchasing their securities and the time they
first learned any representations were false").
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claims, 7 statements of intent to prove damages,8 detailed claim in-
formation,9 and sometimes information on representation and re-
liance.10 These requirements, often in the nature of discovery, con-
flict with the language and to some extent the policy of the class
action rule.
Theoretically, the discovery rules enable one party to obtain in-
formation from another, whereas Rule 23 procedures enable the court
to conduct a class action suit. However, courts have not adhered to
this strict doctrinal distinction. Instead, both rules have been cited
as authority for court orders penalizing unresponsive class members.
The cases seem largely to ignore whether a party or the court is seek-
ing the information;" indeed, sometimes the defendants have urged
the courts to require affirmative action from absent class members
under the authority of Rule 23.12 Requirements to supply informa-
tion or face significant penalties under the purported authority of
either Rule 23 or 37 have the same effect on class members. Dis-
tinctions between the two rules have thus been blurred and both
have emerged as authority for requiring discovery-like information
of absent class members.
7. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 404 (S.D. Iowa 1968)
(stating that failure of the absent class members to so act before trial would com-
pletely bar any future recovery should the defendant be subsequently held liable on
the cause of action).
8. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459, 462
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (the court suggested that it was reasonable to bar the claims of pas-
sive class members unless they filed a statement of their intent to prove damages;
it notified members of the government class to file actual proofs of clain or be
"forever barred.").
9. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1971);
Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968).
10. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir.
1971). A list of defendant's interrogatories to plaintiffs is printed in the Appendix
to Appellant's Brief at 55, Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
11. In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971),
the court cited the discovery rules (Rules 33, 34, and 37) and Rule 23 as authority
for requiring absent class members to answer defendant's interrogatories, id. at 1004-05,
or be dismissed with prejudice, id. at 1006. In Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc.,
281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968), the court cited Rule 23 as authority for
granting defendant's request that class members be required to acknowledge in writing
their intent to submit claims or be barred from any recovery. Although the de-
fendant moved for such a requirement, the court also sought the information in the
interest of "expediency." Id. at 404.
Nor have the courts distinguished between information required by the court and
information required by another party in the cases they cite as authority for the
practice. For example, the Brennan court, 450 F.2d at 1004, cited Minnesota v. United
States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Ana-
conda Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968); and Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D.
70 (D. Utah 1966), as authorities for the principle that "some form of discovery may be
required of class members." However, Brennan was a case in which the opposing
parties sought discovery of class members, while the authorities cited were- cases in
which the court itself apparently sought the information.
12. See Abulaban v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 51 F.R.D. 496, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
See generally Korn v. Franchard, 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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A. Rule 37
Rule 37(b)(2)(c) allows a court to dismiss an action or render a
judgment by default against a disobedient party for failure to com-
ply with discovery requirements. 13 Since the rule gives the court
control only over "parties" and their agents, dispute has focused on
the status of absent class members. Apparently assuming absent class
members are parties and subject to discovery, one court has used
this rule to dismiss with prejudice the claims of those members
who failed to respond,' 4 while other courts have held that absent
class members were not parties and could not be subject to discovery.1a
Rule 37 was not changed when Rule 23 was revised; its original
draftsmen did not contemplate the problems of discovery from ab-
sent class members. Nor does the 1970 revision of Rule 37 indicate
a consciousness of this issue.' 6 Thus, this rule provides no insight as
to whether absent class members are parties subject to discovery. Nor
have the courts dealt satisfactorily with the question of party status.
Although some have suggested that only named plaintiffs are par-
ties,17 all of the courts discussing party status ultimately have based
their arguments on the spirit and purpose of the class action rule.'3
Thus, to call a person a party or not is merely to state a conclusion;
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) provides in relevant part:
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer, di-
rector, or managing agent of a party or person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35,
the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others the following:
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceed-
ings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; . . .
14. Order of Eschbach, J., dated Aug. 17, 1967, set out in Appendix to Brief for
Appellants at 70, Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.
1971). See also Brennan, 450 F.2d at 1004-05. The Brennan court refers at one point to
absent class members as "absent parties." Id. at 1005.
15. See Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Fischer
v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971). See also Bucalo v. General Leisure
Prods. Corp., 15 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 564, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), wherein the court re-
fused to allow the named plaintiff in a class action to withdraw as representative of
the class and become merely a member of the class, noting that he would then not
be subject to discovery.
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37, Advisory Committee's Note (1970 Amendment), at 306-10
(Foundation Press ed. 1970).
17. Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Fischer v. Wolfin-
barger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971); cf. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries
Co., 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
18. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir.
1971); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Fischer v.
Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971); cf. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American
Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the question is whether absent class members should be subject to
discovery, and, if so, under what conditions.'0
B. Rule 23
Courts have invoked subdivisions (c)(2) and (d) of Rule 23 as au-
thority for their imposition of duties and sanctions on class mem-
bers who do not respond to requests for information.20 Neither pro-
vision, however, justifies these results. Subdivision (c)(2) merely en-
ables the court to notify class members in a (b)(3) suit that they will
be included unless they request not to be. This is the only function
19. For example, in Brennan, 450 F.2d at 1004, the court acknowledged that tire"party" question "is a difficult one," admitting that "there is some merit" in the
argument that absent class members, not being parties in any ordinary sense, are not
subject to discovery. The court (lid not directly answer that argument, observing that"under certain circumstances" Rule 37 penalties may be imposed to compel compliance
with discovery orders. Id. And in Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. at 132, the court
reasoned that discovery proceedings directed to members of the class who are not named
plaintiffs are improper. Noting that the class action is designed for the situation in
which joinder of all members of a class is impracticable, the court concluded that
"[ilt is not intended that members of the class should be treated as if they weic
parties plaintiff, subject to the normal discovery procedure, because if that were per-
mitted, then the reason for the rule would fail." Id.
The courts have been unable to apply a meaningful test to determine whether
absent class members are parties because no definitive test is available. In suits other
than class actions "parties" are simply the persons bringing or defending the lawsuit
or are intervenors. The question thus arises only in connection with class suits.
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reason-
able effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make ap-
propriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures
to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or
argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or other-
wise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action,
or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members
to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to inter-
vene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3)
imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring
that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to repre-
sentation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing
with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order in-
der Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
Of the courts relying on Rule 23 for authority, the following cited Rtle 23(c)(2): Min-
nesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968); Iowa v. Union
Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Snpp. 391, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1968). Those citing Rule
23(d) were Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004 (7th Cir.
1971); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., supra at 403; and Harris v. Jones, 41
F.R.D. 70, 74-75 n.9 (D. Utah 1966). The court in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda
Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968), seemed to rely on Rule 23 generally.
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contemplated by the Advisory Committee.21 One court, however,
has argued that subdivision (c)(2) does not prohibit the imposition
of affirmative requirements on absent class members because the
rule does not limit the matters that can be included within the
notice.2 2 This argument ignores the fact that the requests for infor-
mation from absent class members are not commonly understood
as notice. They are more in the nature of discovery.
Under Rule 23(d), only subdivisions (d)(2) and (d)(3) could possibly
apply to requests for information from absent class members, but
even these fall short. Subdivision (d)(2) merely enables the court to
keep class members informed as it deems necessary:2 3 The court may
invite absent class members to comment upon the adequacy of rep-
resentation or to intervene and present claims.2 4 Nothing in the
provision, however, authorizes orders requiring production of dis-
covery-like information from class members or subsequent orders dis-
missing claimants.2 5 Indeed, by referring to the "opportunity" to in-
tervene, the rule suggests that any action would be voluntary, not
mandatory.
Justification of pre-trial discovery of absent class members would
require that class members who respond be considered intervenors.2 G
This, however, conceptually transforms the class suit into a permis-
sive joinder.2 7 This view would undermine the function of class
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 104-05. See 7A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1787, at 159.
22. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 396, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
23. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 393-94 (1967). Professor Kaplan,
reporter and later member of the Advisory Committee, explained that 23(d) consists
of "a number of discretionary steps available to the court for better management of
class actions generally. Among them are orders requiring, 'for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,' that notice be
given to some or all members of the class informing them of any event in the action, -
or of their opportunity to speak their piece on the adequacy of the representation, or
to intervene in the action. Here the Committee was responding to Professor Chafee's
remark, echoed by others, that class members 'ought to be informed as well as rep-
resented.'" Id.
24. See note 20 supra.
25. Subdivision (d)(2) of Rule 23 enables the court to give notice "for the protection
of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action." Protection
of class members seems the primary consideration since all of the types of notice au-
thorized therein would be helpful to class members; it is difficult to see how this
provision could be used to the detriment of class members' interests.
26. The only language in this provision which refers to actions of the sort typically
required by courts under it, e.g., proof of claim, see note 6 supra, is the following:
"['T]he court may make appropriate orders . . . requiring . . . that notice be given
. . . of the opportunity of members . . . to intervene and present claims or defenses
.. " FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) (emphasis added).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a), wherein any number of persons may join in one
action as plaintiffs (or as defendants) if they share a right to relief (or a right to re-
lief is asserted against them) arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and
involving a coinmon question of law or fact. The old version of Rule 23, which re-
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actions. Instead, the Advisory Committee apparently assumed that,
under this provision, class members would be notified to present
claims after the basic class liability decision had been rendered. "
Thus, under 23(d)(2) absent class members may be treated as inter-
venors in the latter part of a trial when they present their claims,
but they cannot be characterized as intervenors prior to trial.
Subdivision (d)(3), the only other section of the rule which might
be relevant, merely enables the court to impose conditions "on rep-
resentative parties or on intervenors." Absent class members, how-
ever, are neither representative parties nor intervenors. To be rep-
resentative parties they must have been qualified by a court deter-
mination that their claims or defenses are typical of those of members
of the class and that they will fairly and adequately protect the
class interest;29 to be intervenors they must have moved to inter-
vene and must have been permitted to do so by the court.30 The
intent of the Advisory Committee was simply to allow the court
to condition the maintenance of the class action on the strength-
ening of the representation, perhaps by the intervention of addi-
tional parties, or to impose conditions on intervenors to assure
"proper and efficient conduct of the action." 31 Thus, this provision
furnishes no basis for imposing conditions on absent class members.
II. Competing Considerations
The lack of an explicit authorization on the face of the rules for
gathering detailed information from class members does not neces-
sarily end the inquiry. Serious problems which the rules do not di-
rectly address may justify judicial experimentation through the liberal
interpretation of those rules.32 At the same time, however, experi-
mentation can only be justified insofar as it is geared toward solu-
tion of problems which presently exist with due regard for the com-
quired some affirmative action of potential class members prior to trial in "spurious"
suits, was considered a permissive joinder device. See 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4j 23.10,
at 2601 (2d ed. 1969). The courts' use of the new rule to require affirmative action
is functionally equivalent.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2), Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106. The
Committee explained: "For example, in 'limited fund' cases, members of the class
have been notified to present individual claims after the basic class decision" of lia-
bility to the class. Id. at 106.
29. Fa. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), (a)(4).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107.
32. Such experimentation in the absence of express authorization by the rules is
not uncommon; cf. 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTnCE: MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d
ed. 1969).
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peting considerations behind the rules. The considerations which
must be examined and ultimately balanced in this context are the
protection of class members, the courts' manageability demands, and
justice to the defendants.
A. Protection of Class Members
A primary concern of the courts should be the protection of the
class members themselves. Because of the impracticality of bringing
all the members of a large class before the court in one suit, Rule
23 and its 1966 revision permits a few representative class members
to bring the action on behalf of the entire class. 33 The resulting
judgment in the suit becomes binding on all class members who
failed explicitly to request exclusion from the class. 14 Previously
class members had to "opt in" to be included, but in 1966 the Ad-
visory Committee changed the rule to require class members to
"opt out."' 35 Specifically, the Committee sought not only to prevent
problems of multiple litigation but also to preserve the claims of
individuals who are unlikely to take affirmative action, perhaps due
to "timidity, ignorance or unfamiliarity with business or legal mat-
ters.' 36 Believing that one goal of the class action was to protect the
individual with a small claim and fearful that small claimants would
fail to respond to class action notices, the Committee determined
that a nonresponse would mean inclusion rather than exclusion.
37
The Advisory Committee's notion of the class action's "historic
mission of taking care of the smaller guy"38 reflects actual usage.
The class action device provides a forum for small claimants because
it is especially appropriate for those who "are in a poor position to
seek legal redress, either because they do not know enough or be-
cause such redress is disproportionately expensive."39 Moreover, in
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 104.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
35. See 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PwkcricE 23.02-1, at 121, 124; 23.10[l], at 2601-03
(2d ed. 1969).
36. Kaplan, supra note 23, at 398.
37. See Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANIITRUst
L.J. 295, 299 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Frankel, Amended Rule 23]. Professor Kaplan
explained the Committee's reasoning as follows:
[R]equiring the individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in the lawsuit would
result in freezing out the claims of people-especially small claims held by small
people-who for one reason or another . . . will simply not take the affirmative
step . . . . [Thus] it seems fair for the silent to be considered as part of the class.
Kaplan, supra note 23, at 397-98.
38. Frankel, Amended Rule 23, supra note 37, at 299 (quoting a conversation with
Kaplan).
39. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm.
L. REv. 684, 686 (1941).
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a society where a single harmful act may cause damage to a large
number of people, the class action can be an important means of pro-
tecting scattered rights. 40 Class suits also have a deterrent effect. They
encourage large businesses to be straightforward in their dealings
with individuals over small claims. 41 And if they fail to deter, they
may still deprive large concerns of unjust enrichment in circumstances
where the individual claims are too small to justify individual law-
suits.
Forcing class members, in effect, to "opt in" by furnishing infor-
mation may undermine the policy of the class action rule in two
ways. First, courts permitting discovery make the unresponsive small
claimant vulnerable to defendants who, in an effort to minimize their
liability, engage in extensive discovery of class members for the sole
purpose of reducing class size and thus the potential amount of re-
covery. Second, the practice of forcing members to "opt in" has im-
posed a double duty on class members. They must take action not
only to be excluded, but also to be included in the judgment. This
double duty requirement means that class members by their inaction
may be both bound by res judicata with respect to future actions
and barred from recovery in the present. Under the original rule
class members had only to take one action, namely to request in-
clusion. Those members failing to respond were not bound by the
judgment. The revised rule requires class members to take action
only if they want to be excluded from the action and judgment.
The double duty practice thus imposes a heavier burden than either
the old or present Rule 23, for it demands that class members meet
the requirements of both.
42
By contrast, the defendant has the advantages of both the old and
new Rule 23. As under the old rule, the defendant, if found liable
by a court which had permitted him discovery, need only satisfy the
40. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Frankel, Amended
Rule 23, supra note 37. Kaplan, supra note 23, at 398, suggests that a class action is
similar to an administrative proceeding wherein scattered interests are represented by
the government. See generally Hazard, Class Actions: The Effect of the Class Action
Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 299.
41. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also id. at 473
(on the usefulness of class actions to deter securities fraud) and Weinstein, Class Ac-
tions: Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 304-05.
42. Furthermore, this double duty may confuse the class member. At the outset of
the action the class member is led to understand that he will be included unless
he withdraws, but he later learns that he must make an active effort to prevent his
claim from being dismissed. Professor Wright suggests that courts should weigh the
confusion problem in deciding whether to require proof-of-claim statements. 7A WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 2, § 1787, at 159. The Brennan court found the confusion argu-
ment relatively persuasive, but required class members to respond nonetheless. Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1971).
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claims of those who took action to insure inclusion. At the same
time the defendant is protected by the rule revision against one-way
intervention43 and multiple litigation,44 since the judgment binds
all who do not exclude themselves.
B. The Courts' Manageability Demands
Courts sometimes advance the argument that requiring informa-
tion of absent class members will render the suit more manageable.
For example, some courts have required class members to file state-
ments of intent to prove damages prior to trial, because it would
serve "expediency" and permit "an early determination of which
parties intend to offer proof of damages. '4 5 Other courts have pre-
ferred to receive proofs of claim prior to adjudication of liability
because it would reveal the "scope of the litigation" and provide a
"meaningful" verdict.4 6 It would thus appear that these courts, anx-
ious about managing class suits, feel more comfortable with the
original version of Rule 23, wherein class members had to "opt in,"
and believe that procedure can be preserved despite the rule re-
vision.47 A return to the old rule, however, will not aid manage-
ability, since much of the information sought is not needed at so
early a stage. Early receipt of statements of intent to prove damages,
proofs of claim, information about circumstances surrounding the
claim, and reliance of the claimant does not simplify a class action,
43. Under old Rule 23 class members were sometimes allowed to intervene after
the court determined defendant's liability to the class. See Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588-89 (10th Cir. 1961). This practice of "one-way in-
tervention" seemed unfair in that class members could await the determination of
liability before joining the action, thus incurring no risk. See also Kaplan, supra note
23, at 385-86. Under the revised rule class members who do not "opt out" are bound
by res judicata to whatever judgment is rendered, thus eliminating any "sideline
sitting."
44. Under the original rule only those who "opted in" were included in the judg-
ment, making multiple actions possible. Thus, the defendant might be forced to de-
fend a number of small lawsuits at high cost. The new rule is particularly advan-
tageous for the defendant "in that it attempts to conclude the class when the decision
is unfavorable to it." Kaplan, supra note 23, at 397.
45. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403, 404 (S.D. Iowa
1968).
46. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459, 462
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 75 n.10 (D. Utah 1966). The Harris
court asserted that the class action "may prove both manageable and beneficial if,
and only if, the members of the class can be brought in some way before the court
prior to trial." Id.
47. For example, the court in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Amer. Brass
Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968), observed that the approach of the old rule was
similar to that of permissive joinder and asserted that the advantages of the per-
missive joinder approach could be "retained under the present rule," id. at 459, im-
pliedly by requiring absent class members to take some affirmative action prior to
trial. "Under the new rule, . . . if [passive members] have no intention of proving
their individual damages, it is to everyone's advantage to know it early." Id.
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for it is common practice to administer class actions in two stages,
with the issue of liability heard first and the question of damages
postponed until later.48 The Advisory Committee explicitly author-
ized these so-called split trials under the rule and indeed advocated
their use.49 Thus, the need, if any, for such information at the out-
set is substantially reduced.
In some situations, however, courts may require information of
class members in order to determine or reappraise the class action
designation.50 Before a class action may proceed under (b)(3), the
court must discern whether common questions predominate over
questions affecting individual members. For example, in a securities
fraud case the court must make a determination that the fraud in-
volved similar misrepresentations and reliance. 51 Yet in many cases
this information will not be necessary; a number of courts have re-
fused to apply a strict requirement of similar misrepresentations and
reliance to such class actions.5 2 Moreover, notwithstanding that such
48. Courts using or approving such split trials include: Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir.
1968): Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Berland v. Mack,
48 F.R.D. 121, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 47
& n.l1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Frankel, Observations]. Judge Frankel advocates the
use of split trials and suggests that many judges, including the district judge in
Harris, could have used a split trial instead of attempting to bring all class mem-
bers before the court. Judge Frankel noted that "[i]f the common questions have
been aptly defined, there should be no need at an earlier stage to have all the in-
dividual class members before the court for discovery or any other purpose." Id. at 47.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4), Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106.
50. See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcricE 23.71, at 1411-12 (2d ed. 1971). Any ap-
praisal of the class status raises a different question of what a court can infer from
the failure of class members to respond. A court might conceivably conclude from a
minimal response that the class was not so numerous that a class action was jus-
tified. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), (c)(l). Yet a lack of response does not mean that
there is no class nor does the language of the revised rule support such an in-
ference. Some courts have held that a lack of apparent class interest was not a com-
pelling reason for refusing to maintain a class action and that the rule does not
permit such "subjective inference." Korn v. Franchard, 456 F.2d 1206, 1209-10 (2d Cir.
1972); Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103. See also
Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 73 (D. Utah 1966). The court in Harris cited varying
forms of alleged misrepresentations and reliance by class members as a reason for
requiring detailed information from absent class members. Yet the Harris case seems
an obvious choice for a class action since, in one subclass at least, the misrepresen-
tations were promulgated by way of commercial advertising broadcasts-by nature
similar, if not the same, misrepresentations. Id. at 72.
52. Courts have developed a lenient attitude toward variations in reliance, particu-
larly in lOb-5 securities fraud cases. See Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465,
471 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), wherein the court noted that variations in proof of reliance are
rarely so substantial as to defeat the class action, and Rule lOb-5 cases always involve
variation in the kind and degree of reliance of each individual investor. See also
Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Indeed in Fischer v. Wolfinbarger,
55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971), the court held that it was not necessary for the
plaintiffs to establish "reliance" in order to recover under Rule lOb-5 and the Se-
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information is in some sense "necessary," the small claimant is often
incapable of supplying it because he lacks the "sophistication and
knowledge" to provide a meaningful response.5 3 Finally, it should
be noted that failure of class members to respond does not lock a
court into a class action, since it may reconsider the class action
designation at any time prior to judgment.5 4
If information from class members is indeed necessary for man-
ageability and fairness, courts may frequently be able to obtain it
in other ways. Specifically, courts could require the class representa-
tives to furnish information about, for instance, their own reliance
on alleged misrepresentations of the defendant, the nature of the
class, and anything else needed to rule on the appropriateness of a
class action. 5 Another court urged the use of less burdensome means
of discovery whenever available, suggesting sampling techniques
whereby questions are directed to a limited number of class mem-
bers selected randomly or on the basis of comprehensiveness of
records."
curities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
Other courts have expanded the definition of "similar misrepresentations." For ex-
ample, in Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court ruled that data
in a series of corporate financial statements, though varying from statement to state-
inent, weic interrelated and cumulative and thus raised common questions suitable for
class action determination. In Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Stipp.
622, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court suggests that the new Rule 23 provides the flexibility
to maintain a class action with different kinds of representations, because the court
can always dismiss the suit as a class action at a later stage and allow it to proceed
on behalf of the named plaintiffs alone.
53. See Korn v. Franchard, 456 F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (2d Cir. 1972). The court noted
that "the returned proof-forms reveal a group which is lacking in the kind of so-
phistication and knowledge which would assure a meaningful response so many years
later as to the specifics of misrepresentations or omissions, even assuming that the
respondents understood the questions." The same problems might develop in other
class actions where the class is comprised of laymen and the issues are complex. The
court noted that the proof-of-claim procedure has usually been used in antitrust
claims "made by government entities where detailed records were kept and objective
questions on proof of damages asked," id. at 1211 n.12, citing Note, The Impact of
Glass Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. CHt. L. REV. 337, 351 n.80 (1971). When the class
members are not small claimants but large businesses or government agencies, there may
be less justification for preserving claims until recovery is assured.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). But at least one judge points out that the courts might
not feel as comfortable about subsequently dismissing the suit as a class action if a
statute of limitations had run. Frankel, Observations, supra note 48, at 42.
55. For example, the representative parties in one antitrust class action furnished
the court with a list of prospective class members, information which would provide
an indication of class size, possible subclasses, and the extent of potential liability.
Iowa v. Union Asphalt &.- Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
56. Unreported opinion of Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., No. 67-C-1899
(N.D. Ill., Feb. 13, 1970), set out in Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. III, Herriman
v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972) (Sup. Ct. docket
no. 71-778).
See also In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
wherein the court refused to require proofs of claim before judgment in the consumer
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Sometimes, however, information which is obtainable only by a
survey of the entire class, for example, statistical data or bulk infor-
mation on class size or characteristics, may contribute to the man-
ageability of a class action by enabling the court to determine the
appropriateness of subclasses or the adequacy of class representation.
Conceivably, information on class size could lead to a settlement,
which, by obviating a trial, would more expeditiously dispose of
large class suits. In any event, class members may supply the infor-
mation as readily without the threat of bar to recoveryY And even
if recovery is barred in a present suit, there is no compelling reason
to bar the bringing of a future action."s
C. Justice for Defendants
The final consideration in the concern for manageability and fair-
ness is justice for the defendant. A defendant may claim that the
information from absent class members is necessary for his defense.I'
In most cases, however, such information is unnecessary to deter-
mine the fact of liability. For example, interrogatories seeking de-
tailed information on individual claims or damages prior to trial
would not be necessary if the liability issue were being tried in a
proceeding separate from the damage issue.60 If the information is
important for the defense, it might be obtained in other ways-from
representative parties, for instance. Theoretically, discovery infor-
mation from representative parties should be typical of the entire
class. Even if that discovery proved insufficient, courts could ensure
class but offered to "aid the parties in 'sampling' or conducting a more intensive
study of the claims within a representative state or subdivision .... "
Such sampling techniques might be particularly helpful for a court's determination
of whether a proposed settlement in fact protects the interests of the class as a whole.
See p. 622 infra.
57. The number of class members in Brennan who ultimately answered the dis-
covery interrogatories totaled 421 out of a class of 535 members. While the threat of
penalty may have contributed to this relatively large response, it may also be attrib-
utable to the fact that counsel for the named plaintiff sent three requests to each
previously unresponding class member over a six-month period. Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (7th Cir. 1971), and Briefs for Appellants,
App. at 123, id.
58. It is true that failure to bar permanently the claims of nonresponding class
members leaves open the possibility of multiple litigation. It seems unlikely, however,
that class members who fail to participate in a pending class suit will bring their
own actions later.
59. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir.
1971); cf. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils Co., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 404 (S.D. Iowa
1968), wherein the court cited "fairness to the defendants" as a reason for requiring af-
firmative action from class members. See p. 603 supra.
In a diversity action, for instance, the defendant may claim that not all absent class
members can meet the jurisdictional amount requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973); p. 621 infra.
60. See, e.g., Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 461, 463-64 (D. Utah 1972).
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fairness by enlarging the number of representative parties. Class
members of a particular type could be required to intervene as a
condition of the action's continuing as a class suit.61 Indeed pro-
visions (d)(3) and (c)(1) 2 of the class action rule specifically authorize
this method of strengthening the representation in a class action.
If, on the other hand, the information is of a type only available
from absent class members, justice may be served without resort to
the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice for failure to re-
spond. If the purpose of a sanction is to induce compliance, 3 a
court should use the mildest sanction that will produce the desired
result. If the Advisory Committee's expectation that absent class
members are likely to remain passive is accurate,0 4 the threat of sanc-
tion may not affect the rate of response at all. It was just this as-
sumption of the court in the Antibiotic Antitrust Cases which led
it to exempt individual class members from submission of the claim
requirements imposed upon government entities within the class.
Individual class members were unlikely to respond, said the court,
until they were assured of recovery since their claims were so small. 6
In practice, then, the layman's response to a formal request is prob-
ably unaffected by threatened sanction.
III. Solutions
In all likelihood the draftsmen of Rule 23 did not fully antici-
pate such problems as discovery of absent class members and im-
mense class size. Consequently, courts have had to implement in-
novative procedures to make class actions more just and manage-
able. Such adaptation should not be discouraged. With the increas-
61. For example, the court could require the intervention of several representative
parties from each of several classes of purchasers, e.g., retailers, wholesalers, and con-
sumers. Or the court might require intervention of representative parties reflecting the
varying circumstances and types of misrepresentation and reliance.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), (d)(3), Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104, 107.
The Committee stated:
An order embodying a determination can be conditional; the court may rule, for
example, that a class action may be maintained only if the representation is im-
proved through intervention of additional parties of a stated type.
Id. at 104. The Committee also observed that, "Subdivision (d)(3) reflects the possi-
bility of conditioning the maintenance of a class action . . . on the strengthening of
the representation . I..." d  at 107.
63. It might be argued that the purpose of a sanction is not to secure compliance,
but to punish. The punishment of dismissal with prejudice, however, is out of all
proportion to the harm caused by nonresponse.
64. See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 397-98; cf. Frankel, Amended Rule 23, supra
note 37, at 299.
65. 333 F. Supp. 267, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 333 F. Supp. 278, 280, 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
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ing complexity of class actions courts need the flexibility to experi-
ment and develop solutions gradually before a particular procedure
is solidified in a rule. The recommended procedures for complex
and multidistrict litigation evolved from a similar pattern of trial
and error.66 Problems under Rule 23 can also be eliminated through
evolving management techniques. Any movement to revise the rule
again is premature; it is too early to pass judgment.
67 However,
courts must not disregard the purpose and language of the revised
rule in their efforts to resolve the problems of justice and man-
agement.
An ideal solution would reconcile needs for discovery with the
class action rule, balancing the competing considerations. The de-
fendant must be allowed to discover information essential to his de-
fense, and yet the class must not be harassed by defendants using
discovery solely to diminish the class and their potential liability.08
Courts must strive for class action manageability and prevent prob-
lems of multiple litigation without contravening the language and
intent of Rule 23. At present, there seems to be no single solution;
instead, a number of procedures should be applied selectively as the
circumstances of a particular case require.
A. No Discovery of Absent Class Members
In most cases the court should deny discovery of absent class mem-
bers and refrain from questioning them,69 using alternative measures
to ensure manageability and fairness. Specifically, better use of split
trials and representative parties would obviate the need for discovery
of absent class members in many instances. Whether sought by the
court or the opposing party, information from absent class members
regarding claims, reliance on alleged misrepresentations, circum-
stances surrounding purchase, proofs of claim, or statements of in-
66. See generally I fOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE: MANUAL FOR COMiPLEx LITIGATION
(2d ed. 1969).
67. But see REPORT AND RECOfATMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMITTEE ON RULE 23
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS,
REVISED DRXFT OF RULE 23 (1973).
68. One federal judge suggests that the courts have an "additional responsibility
to protect absent class members in the complex class actions of today." Weinstein,
supra note 41, at 300. Professor Wright argues that discovery and proof-of-claim pro-
cedures should be limited in order to prevent defendants from using discovery to
induce class members to exclude themselves. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1792,
at 196 n.96.
69. Class members would still be subject to discovery under FED. R. Civ. P. 30
(Depositions Upon Oral Examination) and 31 (Depositions Upon Written Questions),
which permit discovery "of any person." However, this procedure is more expensive for
defendants, and unlikely to be used except in special situations where it is clear that
a particular class member has important information.
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tent to prove claims is not necessary prior to a determination of
liability, but becomes pertinent only in the second stage of a split
trial. Information about the nature or composition of the class, in-
formation regarding evidence to be presented by plaintiffs, and clari-
fication of allegations can be supplied by the representative parties.
For example, one court allowed unusually generous discovery of
representative parties to compensate for prohibiting discovery of ab-
sent class members.70 Representative parties might also assist a court
in determining whether a class action is appropriate or how best to
conduct the action, both decisions that must be made early.71 Fur-
thermore, courts have the authority to order the intervention of ad-
ditional representative parties to expand sources of information.7 2
For example, the court might require intervention of representative
parties who reflect different circumstances, types of misrepresenta-
tion, or reliance of various subclasses.
This alternative satisfies a number of considerations. It manifests
a strict adherence to the language and intent of Rule 23; it eliminates
the potential misuse of the discovery process to decimate the class;
it mitigates problems of multiple litigation, for all unresponsive
class members would be bound by the judgment; and by restricting
discovery to representative parties prior to a finding of liability, it
serves the goal of manageability more adequately than does sub-
jecting numerous class members to interrogatories or proof-of-claim
requirements. Although some courts seem to feel an action is man-
ageable only if all class members are assembled and brought before
the court at the outset,72 it is apparent that such measures, rather
than enhancing manageability, may have the opposite effect. The
costs of securing information from representative parties or securing
it from class members after liability has been established would, in
70. Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 535 (N.D. Ga. 1972). This court
allowed interrogatories only to the party plaintiffs, the Atlanta and Rome Boards of
Education, but because plaintiffs intended to prove a statewide conspiracy with evi-
dence relating to Atlanta and Gainesville activities, the court permitted defendants
to discover "work-product" from the Atlanta Board under Rule 26(b)(3), namely "all
information that it [the Board] has collected with respect to Gainesville and any
other school boards, including a list of the nanies of persons to whom the Atlanta
Board has spoken so that defendant may take their depositions." The court also
pointed out that defendants were free to use "other discovery techniques available as
to non-parties." Id. at 535.
71. Representative parties have an interest in providing information on the appro-
priateness of a class action because a court decision aainst allowing a class action
could make continuation of the suit by them as individuals less attractive.
72. See note 62 supra.
73. See Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 75 n.10 (D. Utah 1966). See also Philadel-
phia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
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most cases, be less than multiple communications with all class
members.7 4 This alternative would not be adequate, however, if the
representative parties cannot provide information needed by the
defendant to defend on the merits or by the court to make a de-
termination of representativeness; in these situations one of the al-
ternative solutions might be more suitable.
B. Discovery With No Penalty
A second alternative would allow discovery of absent class mem-
bers, without a penalty for nonresponse. 75 A defendant could seek
unlimited discovery of absent class members and the court would be
unrestricted in its efforts to survey or define the class and the issues.
This procedure would comply with the letter and spirit of the rule,
for class members would be included unless they chose to "opt out"
without an additional requirement of affirmative action to assure
recovery. For the same reason this alternative would preclude mul-
tiple litigation and abuse of the discovery process to diminish the class.
Discovery without sanction could also be used as a preliminary
step to determine if subclasses are necessary or if further discovery
would serve any useful purpose. In Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Insurance Company, for example, the use of discovery without
a sanction might have revealed that the asserted defenses were not
sustainable."
74. A requirement that all claims be presented prior to trial might eliminate the
need for subsequent notice and discovery if further proof of damages or reliance were
unnecessary, but it would result in wasted judicial resources and unnecessary costs if
liability to the class were not established in the first proceeding. Court costs in gen-
eral might be reduced, however, if early information from absent class members re-
vealed that a class action was inappropriate or if it induced settlement, because
the expense of conducting a trial would be obviated.
75. The court in Korn v. Franchard urged this approach, saying, "Unless and until
liability to the class is established or seems reasonably certain . . . .members should
not be barred for failure to track down [the requested] information, even though
such a requirement might later be a reasonable condition to their participation in
any recovery, assuming liability is established." 50 F.R.D. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This
approach has also been used in cases where the court itself sought information from
class members. In Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C. 1972), a class action
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), the court sought information regard-
ing discriminatory employment practices in order to make effective rulings on the
boundaries of the class, the need for subclasses, and the individual rights of clas
members, and to aid a possible reevaluation of the suitability of class status in general.
The court refused to bar from recovery those members who failed to supply the ie-
quested information. Id. at 71-72. See also Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 108
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), where the court sent questionnaires to class members under the no-
tice provisions of 23(d)(2), but used or threatened no penalty.
76. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971). Mid-
western sought discovery in order to establish (1) that it had not received information
that could reasonably be expected to put it on notice of certain fraudulent activities
and cause it to report them to the Securities Commissioner, and (2) that plaintiffs'
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C. Discovery With the Sanction of Exclusion
Another approach would permit discovery backed by the sanction
of excluding silent members from the class without prejudice to
their individual claims.77 Unresponsive class members would be
denied the benefit of recovery through the class action, but would
be permitted to press their own causes of action at a later date. Un-
like one-way intervention,78 the class member would not be permitted
to join the class suit after liability was established, but would have
to bring a separate action at his own risk and expense.7 9
This procedure should be implemented in connection with a stand-
ard for discovery of absent class members which is higher than that
for the representative plaintiffs. This would insure that the defendant
is acting in good faith and that unnecessary multiple litigation is
avoided. Courts could require proof that the desired information
was necessary for the defense and unavailable from representative
parties or by any other realistic means, 0 including defendant's own
records."' Under this standard, which is similar to that required to
obtain work-product discovery of another attorney,8 2 a court would
have to weigh the cost of alternative means of obtaining the infor-
mation to determine if such means were "realistic."
The proposed standard shares the recognition in Brennan v. Mid-
western United Life Insurance Company 3 that discovery of absent
class members should not be allowed "as a matter of course," but it
requires satisfaction of a higher burden than the Brennan "necessary
injuries were not caused by its failure to report to the Securities Commissioner be-
cause the purchasers themselves had reported more information than the company
knew of. Brief for Appellees at 4-5, id.
77. Cf. Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1277 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
Note, however, that the Court of Claims was not bound to follow Rule 23. See note
2 supra.
78. See note 43 supra.
79. Once defendant's liability to the class is established, individuals excluded from
the class might be able to recover, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. However,
such a practice increasingly resembles one-way intervention and could result in the
sideline-sitting which the 1966 revision to Rule 23 sought to eliminate. See note 43
supra.
80. Cf. Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 463 (D. Utah 1972),
where the court suggested that interrogatories to the class be allowed only "upon a
strong showing of necessity or at least of likely material aid in the resolution of
common issues."
81. See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 303. Judge Weinstein noted that although
class members typically do not have adequate records regarding damages, often the
records of the defendant, "particularly in securities cases," will contain the information.
The same would seem to apply to antitrust cases.
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947),
wherein the Supreme Court suggested that discovery of an attorney's work-product
would be allowed only upon a showing of necessity or a showing "that denial of pro-
duction would cause hardship or injustice." Id. at 509.
83. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971).
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or helpful" test and imposes a milder sanction than dismissal with
prejudice. 84 The court in Brennan, a Rule lOb-5 securities fraud
action, reasoned that discovery of absent class members was accept-
able when "necessary or helpful" to the proper presentation and ad-
judication of the suit and that "justice to all parties" requires it as
long as it is not being used to reduce the size of the class or to take
undue advantage of class members.85 However, the problems that
arise from such a test are manifold. The "necessary or helpful" lan-
gu age is broad and prone to subjective interpretation; almost all
discovery efforts could fall within one of the two categories, which
seem to exclude only that discovery which may be termed "useless."
The second part of the Brennan test contributes even less to the
search for a more objective standard. Discovery to ensure "justice
to all parties" offers no concrete guidelines; it is an expression of
the conclusion that discovery should take place. The third test, that
discovery not be allowed to reduce or take advantage of the class,
is an imperative condition but unfortunately difficult to enforce. The
Brennan court, finding nothing in the record to suggest an ulterior
motive, was satisfied. Discovery efforts, however,, can have a dual
purpose; some interrogatories appearing reasonable under the mild
Brennan test could in fact be used to harass class members and
reduce their numbers.
The proposed approach satisfies a number of important considera-
tions. A defendant complying with the stricter standard, having dem-
onstrated a clearly legitimate purpose for discovery, cannot be accused
of abusing the discovery process to the detriment of absent class mem-
bers.86 In addition, the exclusion penalty would not irrevocably harm
passive class members, for they would not be barred from recovery
in a separate suit. This procedure should satisfy those who believe
that some threat is necessary to secure compliance. And although it
does not comply literally with Rule 23, this procedure would come
closer to implementing its intent to protect the small claimant than
does the current practice in some suits of dismissing the nonre-
sponding class member with prejudice.
84. Id. at 1005. Professor Wright suggests that a milder sanction would have been
appropriate in Brennan. 7A WRIGHT C MILLER, supra note 2, § 1792, at 196 n.98.
85. 450 F.2d at 1005.
86. The court, which could have no similar interest in abusing the discovery
process, would not judge the necessity of obtaining information from absent class mem-
bers to serve its manageability needs by this higher standard. The court should never-
theless consider the effect of such information requirements on the class. For example,
if court-initiated interrogatories would require legal or technical assistance to answer,
the court should carefully consider the need for the information in view of the pos-
sibility that many class members would fail to.respond.
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Nor would this approach engender serious problems of multiple
litigation. The higher standard for discovery would ensure that class
members were not subject to exclusion as a matter of course. More-
over, the class member who did not respond to informational re-
quests is unlikely to take the initiative to bring his own action after
exclusion.
The higher discovery standard would have the disadvantage of in-
creased court costs, however. The administration of a court-imposed
test could involve the court in controversies and determinations re-
quiring close supervision of the discovery process, contrary to the
recent trend under the Federal Rules to remove courts from that
role.87 This inefficiency, however, would be minor since the court
would avoid involvement in all but unusual cases where the higher
standard for discovery was met.
D. Specific Situations in Which Information Gathering Is Proper
It is not possible to enumerate completely the situations in which
discovery directed at absent class members is proper. A few examples
of specific situations, however, might help to clarify the range of
responses available to a court exercising its sound discretion.
1. Jurisdictional Information
In the recent case of Zahn v. International Paper Co.a8 the Supreme
Court held that a diversity suit cannot be maintained as a class ac-
tion under Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of unnamed plaintiffs whose
claims do not meet the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement even
though-the claims of named plaintiffs do. A suit must be dismissed
as to any plaintiff who fails to satisfy the jurisdictional amount re-
quirements. The clear implication of this decision is that information
about a class member's claim is relevant to the jurisdiction of the
court. A defendant's request for such information at the outset of
the suit would clearly be proper, though there is no reason that a
sanction greater than exclusion of silent members is necessary. A
plaintiff who does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the
federal district courts is normally not prejudiced in pursuing his in-
dividual claim in another forum.
87. See ADVISORY COMMIrTEE's EXPLANATORY STATEMENT CONCERNING AMENDMENT OF
DIscOvERY RULES, at 255-56 (Foundation Press ed. 1970); Fv. R. Civ. P. 33(a), Advisory
Committee's Note (1970 Amendment), at 290 (Foundation Press ed. 1970).
88. 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973).
The Yale Law Journal
2. Settlement Information
Under Rule 23(e) all settlements must be approved by the court
and notice of the proposed settlement given to all members of the
class. Since the settlement would set a fixed sum available for satis-
fying all claims, the amount of individual claims before settlement
is important to absent members of the class. Requests for informa-
tion from absent class members might aid a court in discharging its
obligation to see that the representative parties have fairly and
adequately protected the interests of the class in compromising the
action. 9 Moreover, the concern expressed by commentators with
respect to abuses in the settlement process90 suggests that a height-
ened judicial concern over the terms of settlement would be more
than proper.
Information relevant to the fairness of a settlement might be
gathered from a random sample of absent class members if notice
to all members of the class is infeasible. Such information regarding
prospective claims would give the court some indication of the ap-
propriate aggregate settlement. The sanction of exclusion, however,
might not be appropriate if the randomly selected class members
failed to respond. The court could resort to the less onerous alterna-
tive of scaling down the aggregate settlement in proportion to the
nonresponse rate.
Conclusion
No single procedure will adequately resolve all possible problems
related to discovery of absent class members. Instead, courts need to
remain flexible, resorting to different alternatives according to the
circumstances. Ideally, courts will be able to develop management
techniques that are consistent with the provisions and intent of the
class action rule by using split trials, more representative parties,
higher discovery standards, and milder penalties, thus enhancing the
capacity of the class action device to adjudicate complex disputes
efficiently and expeditiously.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
90. See, e.,., Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-
trust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUMa. L. Ruv. 1, 5-12
(1971).
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